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becomes the fulfilment of his potential (120). With this explanation, Alexander not only 
produces a plausible naturalistic account of the human telos without invoking supernatural 
or theological principles; he also incorporates the main insights of Stoic and Epicurean 
rivals (119–21). 
Ethics after Aristotle succeeds on many fronts. It provides a quick and accessible survey 
of a neglected chapter of the history of philosophy and, as such, reveals new avenues 
for further study. It also brings to life an active tradition of engagement with a set of 
philosophical ideas and problems, demonstrating positions and moves that may be worth 
pursuing in contemporary ethical debates. Admittedly, Inwood’s discussion of certain topics 
and philosophers is rushed or incomplete, as he himself admits, but here I think the vice 
actually becomes a virtue of the text: it invites us to inquire more deeply into these matters 
in our own research. 
B e n j a m i n  A .  R i d e r
University of Central Arkansas
Adriel M. Trott. Aristotle on the Nature of Community. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014. Pp. xiv + 239. Cloth, $95.00.
This is a fresh, substantial, and engaging contribution to the ongoing Aristotle revival 
in political philosophy and theory. Trott’s project, like that of other works in this newish 
tradition, is not simply to interpret Aristotle but to advance an interpretation that has 
practical (in Aristotle’s sense) significance, one that employs Aristotle-interpretation as 
a starting point for calling into question key elements of the modern Western political 
imaginary. The book is as much a contribution to democratic theory as it is to Greek 
philosophy. This is not at all to say that Trott’s approach to the Greek texts lacks rigor. To 
the contrary, she presents an interpretation of the Politics based on careful close reading of 
key passages informed by a thoughtful and plausible overall sense of Aristotle’s apparent 
intention.
Trott’s take on the Politics starts with her claim that we cannot understand the central 
assertion of the Politics—that human beings are political animals, and that the polis itself 
exists by nature and not by mere convention—without examining what Aristotle means by 
‘nature,’ something he does not discuss in the Politics. But in the Physics, he clearly opposes 
avant la lettre the modern Western way of treating “nature” as a system of necessity, as Kant’s 
“heteronomy of efficient causality,” as a system that opposes human reason and freedom, 
one that our reason strives to overcome. For Aristotle, however, nature is not such a system 
or a process at all—but a class of beings marked by internal causality: “I turn to Aristotle 
for a refreshingly distinct sense of physis” as “the internal source of change whereby the 
natural thing fulfills its end” (41). Her approach to Aristotle on nature builds on the work 
of other current scholars, notably Aryeh Kosman and Christopher Long.
But Trott is not interested in defending Aristotle’s conception of nature against modern 
ones, nor in showing that the two natures are somehow compatible. Instead, she uses 
Aristotle on nature as a key to understanding what he means by saying that human beings 
are naturally political animals: “Being an apologist for Aristotle is not my goal . . . this project 
attempts to offer a better way to think about political life that comes out of understanding 
Aristotle in a new light in order to encourage a better way of living politically. Against a view 
of community that is individualist, instrumentalist, or communitarian, where each position 
is, in its way, exclusionary, Aristotle offers a view of community needed at this time” (13). 
On her reading, Aristotle understands the polis as a natural entity, one that contains its own 
end (telos), and whose work (ergon) is continuously actualizing that end. She is not saying 
that the polis is a living thing, nor that it is separate from and superior to the citizens who 
compose it: “The citizen and the polis, in contrast to the organ and the body, have the same 
end . . . the happiness of each human being is the same as that of the happiness of the polis” 
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(67). Political activity is natural because it coincides with human nature: “By making the 
active fulfillment of the human being that which makes us political, Aristotle points to the 
active nature of being human and being a political community. I argue in this book that 
the activity that makes us human is also the activity that manifests the political community 
in its activity: deliberating over living well, the activity of logos” (57). 
If asked the liberal (Millian) question of which comes first, the individual or the state, 
Trott’s Aristotle answers “neither.” What makes us human is continuous activity of political 
deliberation about the meaning of living well, not adherence to any fixed law, or principle, 
or set of institutions; and the good Aristotelian polis encourages such deliberative activity 
(136–37, n. 2). In the context of modern democratic theorizing, her position is closer to 
that of agonistic politics of an Arendtian sort, than to liberal democracy, or republicanism, 
or even deliberative democracy of the Habermasian or Rawlsian variety—all of which she 
considers and criticizes from her Aristotelian perspective: “My argument hinges strongly 
on this point: Aristotle’s view of community keeps in view the question of whether it is 
achieving its end and whether the end it seeks is best” (165).
As this brief summary of a complex, nicely written, and especially well-organized 
book should make clear, readers of Aristotle will find much to challenge in Aristotle on the 
Nature of Community. Given its ambition and scope, Trott’s work cannot possibly deliver 
a fully persuasive case for her reading of the Politics. But this is admirable; while never 
fully persuasive (how could it be?), Trott’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Politics is plausible 
throughout, sharpening questions that badly need sharpening, opening the way to further 
discussion, both theoretical and practical. 
S t e p h e n  S a l k e v e r
Bryn Mawr College
William E. Mann, editor. Augustine’s Confessions: Philosophy in Autobiography. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. Pp. xiv + 223. Cloth, $65.00.
This collection of eight essays on Augustine’s most widely read work focuses, as William 
Mann says in his introduction, on Augustine as a philosopher. Not every reader will agree 
that Augustine did indeed philosophize. Many would insist that whatever speculation 
Augustine engaged in, it was solely as a theologian. Yet each of the authors in this superb 
volume approaches Augustine in the context of the philosophy of the late Roman world, 
especially Neoplatonic philosophy. Their success in showing how the themes of the 
Confessions resonate with the language of philosophers of the time—Plotinus chief among 
them—and wrestle with many of the same issues vindicates Mann’s claim. Anyone interested 
in understanding the Confessions will have to confront these eight essays and ponder their 
philosophical analysis of Augustine’s thought.
Mann has arranged the essays in the order of the part of the Confessions with which they 
principally deal. Partly as a result, the subject of each essay is often related most closely to 
that of the piece it follows or precedes. The reader can therefore profitably peruse the essays 
in just the order in which they are presented, with a cumulative argument building from 
one to the next. The first three pieces demonstrate how important for Augustine was the 
notion of an active God, intervening directly into the world. Peter King argues that Augustine 
drew from the Platonic tradition his vision of an ascent of the mind toward the divine. Yet 
in contrast to the Platonists, Augustine saw sexuality as the primary obstacle to the mind’s 
efforts to rise beyond itself, and he thought God’s intervention, through grace, was necessary 
for the enterprise’s success. According to Tomas Ekenberg, Augustine’s view of the will also 
borrows heavily from the philosophers, though Augustine never finally lands on a single 
theory of will. Again, God’s grace is necessary to set the will aright. Nicholas Wolterstorff 
shows how for Augustine the aim of living is the philosophers’ “good life” (eudaimonia). But 
Augustine views the good life not as the “estimable life” but rather as one that is happy or 
joyful. And here again, it is fully attainable only in God’s presence, after death.
